The Supremacy of the President

N. forces regroup and continue as a military presence in the region for months, perchance years, to come. What was popularly received by the United Nations as no less than an announcement that the "Yanks are coming," joining what many in telling considered a hopeless U.N. operation, was received with shock on Capitol Hill, where non even the chairs of the congressional hostile affairs and fortify services committees had been informed. "We received no notification," said Senator Strom Thurmond, chair of the Senate build up Forces Committee, who learned about the new foreign policy on television (Dettmer, 1995, p. 8).

The debate between Congress and the electric chair as to which branch of g everyplacenment may declare contend is not new. As far back as the 19th century, President John Quincy Adams observed that the "respective authoritys of the presidency and Congress in the case of war with foreign powers are yet undetermined. possibly they can never be defined" (Dettmer, 1995, p. 8). Clearly, however, founders of the U.S. Constitution mean some degree of sharing authority in the load of troops abroad. According to Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution, Congress shall have the power "to declare war," "to raise and support an army," and "to render and maintain a dark blue." But doubts still arise because in Article II, Sec

tion 2, the Constitution declares that the chair "shall be the commander in chief of the army and navy of the United States." Ambiguity is present as to the respective powers of these dickens branches in entering hostilities, alone a sharing of power is implied.

Rotunda, R. (1995, May 25). "Fixing the War Powers Act."

Since the founding of the nation, the United States has been booked in well over 200 military hostilities with foreign powers. Yet, Congress has declared or authorized only cardinal wars. In attempting to reign in every conflict bunk under congressional authorization, the War Powers Resolution ignores this historical regard of Congress to death chairs in waging foreign hostilities.

Repeatedly, as in the war in Indochina and the Gulf War, and the attempts to free hostages in Iran, Lebanon, Central America, Grenada and Tripoli, the prexy declined to file the fulfill under the War Powers Resolution as an "hostility," thus avoiding the 60-day clock. Congress has responded to this evasion only once in the Lebanon crisis, and even then simply negotiated a compromise allowing the president to maintain a military presence for well over 500 days (Ides, 1984, pp. 642650).

Nevertheless, the basic principle that the president should not be empowered to wage foreign hostilities at will, without consulting Congress, is a sound one. In order to restore a prudent and limited war-making authority of the president, the War Powers Resolution should be amend into a realistic law that recognizes the mutual constitutional obligations of both the president and Congress. The 60-day reporting requirement should be preserved in the spirit of demanding that the president "consult" with Congress regarding foreign hostilities, but the deadlines for congressional approval after which the president is supposed to allow hostilities should be removed and replaced with a mechanism that demands "positive" action by Congress. Instead of imposing an unreali
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